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large or particularly intricate. Rather, 
hedging strategies on the institution's 
proprietary liability (that is, in legal 
terms, its own personal liabilities) are 
organised on the basis of the entire swap 
book. The institution considers the broad 
range of its exposure, sometimes by 
currency or by type of business, and then
sets in place hedging arrangements tor o o o
contain that exposure within acceptable 
limits. Thus hedging is fluid and generally 
not contract-specific.
For the Court of Appeal to seek a 
nexus between the agreement with the 
local authority and the hedgingJ o o
agreement with a third party would 
necessarily be a difficult task. Tracing any 
asset through such a mixture would be 
similarly complicated.
However, the proper analysis of an 
interest rate swap, based on the analysis 
set out above, might show that it is 
possibly not a single executory contract
in any event. The courts are assuming 
that there is one single contract (becauseo x
the point is not being taken before them) 
and therefore looking for a hedge that 
operates in the same manner. When the 
interest rate swap is seen to be what it is, 
an amalgam of debts which may or may 
not crystallise, the nexus between the 
hedge to the original interest rate swap 
agreement perhaps seems less opaque.
The better approach might be to 
assess whether the risk assumed by the 
bank is one which the bank sought to 
address through hedging arrangements 
which were not a requirement of the 
agreement any more than it was a 
requirement of the agreement for the 
local authority to procure further risk 
management protection. The defence 
should only be available in those terms 
where the risk of passing on is within the 
common intention of the parties. In 
Kleinwort Benson the plaintiff's hedging 
strategy was the result of a unilateral
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The new government, as part of its 
general reforming zeal, has decided to 
review the conveyancing procedures in 
England and Wales and, in particular, to 
seek to stamp out the practice of 
gazumping which, apparently, after the 
recent and prolonged slump in the 
property market, has returned to cast its 
shadow over the conveyancing scene. The 
practice is well known and almost 
universally frowned upon. In short, the 
vendor agrees, subject to contract, to sell
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a house to the purchaser for, say, £70,000 
and then subsequently refuses to 
exchange contracts unless the purchaser 
raises the price to £75,000   usually 
because a higher offer has been made by 
another party. If the purchaser refuses to 
meet the new asking price, he or she is
out of pocket as a result of incurring 
expenditure on search fees and a survey. 
The purchaser understandably feels 
aggrieved and considers that 
compensation should be available 
although the law at present offers no such 
remedy. The question which arises is 
whether some change in the law could 
usefully be made.
The enthusiasm to revisit the 
problem may be new but the difficulties 
in tackling it have been recognised for 
some considerable time. Probably the 
first occasion that gazumping came to 
public attention was the introduction, in 
1971, by Kevin McNamara MP of the 
Abolition of Gazumping and Kindred 
Practices Bill. As is the usual fate of 
Private Members' bills, this did not reach 
the statute book; but the matter was 
referred to the Law Commission, who 
declined to recommend any legislative 
change. It is interesting to consider some
o o
of the proposals which were considered 
to determine what course of action, if 
any, might now be considered to beJ o
appropriate.
POSSIBLE REMEDIES
One option is to make the practice of 
gazumping a criminal offence. Apart from 
the very real problem of defining such an 
offence, there is a serious objection in 
principle. It is not generally a criminal 
offence to break a contract. This being 
the case, it is difficult to see any 
justification for the criminalisation of a 
refusal to enter a binding contract. The 
criminal law should, it is submitted, have 
no place in the present context.
An alternative to the imposition of 
criminal sanctions is to require the 
vendor to compensate the purchaser for 
expenditure which the latter incurs if the 
vendor seeks to back out of the deal. At 
present, the law will only award such 
compensation in unusual cases of pre- 
contractual expenditure and certainly 
only where the expenditure is that 
normally incurred in a conveyancing 
transaction   see Regalian Properties pic v 
London Docklands Development Corporation 
[1995] 1 All ER 1005. Changing the law 
to allow the purchaser compensation
would certainly be seen by some as an 
improvement.
A difficulty in the way of such a 
proposal is, however, its somewhat one- 
sided nature, which may result in 
hardship to the vendor. Consider a case 
where A is seeking to move house and has 
found an attractive property owned by C. 
All is dependent upon the sale of A's own 
house. P, having inspected A's house, 
makes an offer to buy it, and this offer is 
accepted, subject to contract. A then 
makes an offer to buy C's house, which is 
accepted, again subject to contract. A 
then commissions a survey on C's house. 
P, having commissioned his own survey 
on A's house, then pulls out of the 
transaction because A will not reduce the 
price which had been agreed, subject to 
contract. This then causes the proposed 
purchase of C's property to fall through. 
Although A will not have to compensate P 
for his pre-contract expenditure, neither 
will he be able to claim from either C or 
P in respect of his own expenditure. In 
this scenario, it is A who will feel 
aggrieved, having been 'gazundered' by P 
without any entitlement to compensation 
from him. This practice became familiar 
during the worst of the property slump.
PRE-CONTRACT DEPOSITS
The obvious answer to this is to insist 
that, where there is an agreement which 
is subject to contract, both parties pay a 
pre-contract deposit to a stakeholder. 
This deposit is forfeit to the other side if 
one party pulls out of the transaction.
The introduction of such a system 
was recommended bv both the Law 
Commission and by the Farrand 
Committee. One advantage of such a 
scheme is that, unlike the position where 
compensation is available, further action 
to actually recover that compensation is
unnecessary: the aggrieved party simply 
recovers the deposit. The Farrand 
Committee recommended the taking of a 
pre-contract deposit of 0.5%, while 
current thinking seems to favour the
o
much larger figure of 5%. There are 
problems with both practices, 
particularly the latter, where, if a person 
was selling a house for £100,000 and 
buying another for the same figure then, 
before any legally binding commitment 
was entered into, a sum of £10,000 
would have to be paid, representing 
£5,000 in respect of each transaction. 
Clearly, this is a large sum of money 
which the vendor may be unwilling or 
unable to find.
There are also other practical 
problems. An integral part of the scheme 
recommended by the Farrand 
Committee was to recognise that there 
exist situations, such as the receipt of an 
unsatisfactory survey, when the purchaser 
should be able to withdraw from the 
transaction without losing the pre- 
contractual deposit. Another occasion for 
withdrawal without penalty would be 
where either party could not proceed 
with the projected transaction because of 
inability to exchange contracts on a 
linked transaction. The ability to 
withdraw with impunity weakens the 
scheme's utility as an anti-gazumping 
device but is essential in the interests of 
justice as the following scenario 
demonstrates.
A agrees, subject to contract, to sell 
his house to B for £100,000 and also 
agrees, subject to contract, to buy C's 
house for £120,000. He is then made 
redundant, can no longer afford to pay 
the increased mortgage on the proposed 
purchase and so, reluctantly, pulls out of 
the two transactions. If the pre-contract 
deposit system was in force, and A was 
unable to withdraw from the transactions
for cause then, in addition to losing his or 
her job, A would also lose both of the 
pre-contract deposits that had been paid. 
Perhaps examples such as this help to 
explain why the voluntary scheme of pre- 
contractual deposits has not been widely 
adopted.
THE FUTURE
The root of the gazumping problem 
lies in the fact that in England, unlike 
Scotland, it is normal for conveyancing 
transactions to be linked with, at times, 
lengthy chains being formed. Inevitably, 
this will cause delays in the formation ol 
binding contracts and so it is difficult to 
see that the frustrations attendant upon 
these delays can be obviated. While lew 
would defend the morality of gazumping, 
in general, there are situations where 
such a course of action may be free from 
condemnation. Suppose a situation 
where A has agreed, subject to contract, 
to sell his house to B for £100,000; but 
B's ability to enter a binding contract is 
dependent upon his or her ability to sell 
his or her own property and that the
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prospects of this do not seem good. A 
then receives an offer from C, a first time 
buyer, to buy the house for £105,000. As 
the prospects of a quick sale seem to be 
excellent and will enable A to enter a 
formal contract to buy D's house, it 
would take a good deal of will power on 
A's part to reject C's offer and wait for B 
to sell his or her house and also risk 
losing the projected purchase of D's 
property. If A does accept C's offer, 
which is highly understandable, B will 
have been gazumped.
Gazumping is an issue which 
generates understandably strong
O J O
emotions. It would seem, however, to be 
an inevitable by-product of the 
necessarily prolonged time period which 
affects chain transactions. While this may 
appear to be a somewhat conservative 
approach, it is suggested that any 
legislative attempt to seek to eradicate the 
practice may well do more harm than 
good. ®
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